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Similarly, we need studies of presidential constitutional politics
and not only of presidential war power and emergency power.
Harry Truman's expansion of the "imperial presidency" has really
not been carefully assessed from a constitutional standpoint.
Neither has Lyndon Johnson's, or for that matter Richard Nixon's
or Ronald Reagan's, except, of course, when the courts rapped their
knuckles. The constitutional cavalierness of Reagan administration
leaders is highly suspect. We need a scholarly assessment of it and
hopefully before minor bits and pieces of it hit the courts.
Constitutional behavior occurs in all three branches and at
both the federal and state level. We, the People also impact constitutional processes-or at least are supposed to. We need to know
about all this-when it happens, how it happens, why it happens,
and its results. A step out of our Supreme Court's Constitution
fixation would, I think, serve us all well.
JOHN P. ROCHE3
Our first priority must be to recover from the Bicentennial. I
knew it was going to be bad when in 1985 a staff member of the
commission in Washington wrote to suggest that I organize a costume party for television which would feature leading framers interviewing "Lock, Hobbs, and Montesque" (sic). But even my worstcase view was overwhelmed by the blast which followed as forests
were felled to provide paper for God only knows how many books
and articles, seemingly on any topic that an ingenious author could
link to the Constitution and its authors.
Basically I am a tolerant soul. Having grown up listening to
oracular great aunts tell how Irish-Americans won the Battle of
Bunker Hill, or Gettysburg, or the Argonne Forest, I could chuckle
compassionately when various writers ascribed the Constitution's
organizing principles to the Torah, the "Great Peace" of the Iroquois Confederacy, the Koran, or old Norse customary law. And,
as Madison once noted, turning to Locke or Montesquieu was "a
field of research which is more likely to perplex than to decide."
However, what led me to call Leonard Levy and a couple of
other old friends and suggest a year in Australia was the onslaught
of the political theologians. One might have thought that the Convention was a Great Council of the Church comparable to Nicea or
Chalcedon and the framers, like the Church Fathers, animated
solely by the Paraclete. While I yield to no one in my respect for
the "Republican Virtue" of the framers, my forty years in the pri3.
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mary sources indicate that-like able politicians of every era-they
could on occasion "rise above principle." Moreover, they did not
confuse politics with religion. I'm not certain they would have gone
as far as Winston Churchill, who allegedly observed of a petition
protesting the morality of one of his wartime policies, "Send it to
the Archbishop--morality is a Church of England matter," but in
my judgment few lost any sleep over, say, the slavery compromise.
Then, just to make life more chaotic for us pedants with our
addiction to primary sources, Attorney General Edwin Meese
threw a grenade into the duck pond, calling for a "Jurisprudence of
Original Intent." Thus psychoanalyzing the dead became a growth
industry. Not only were the actual participants at Philadelphia put
on the couch, but some attempted to read the minds of the 1700 +
delegates who participated in the ratification process. The last stage
was missed-trying to discern the intent of the voters who chose the
delegates; perhaps by this time the money (estimated at over fifty
million dollars!) that was being ladled out by the Bicentennial Commission, the NEH, private corporations, and various foundations
ran out? Yet this cornucopia provided great fun while it lasted: as
the sardonic Charles Pinckney is said to have remarked when Robert Morris was tossed in jail for debt, "a fool and his money are
some party."
This may seem like an uncharitable approach to our sacred
heritage of constitutionalism, but in justification let me note that I
decided not to be the skunk at the garden party, specifically, not to
bring out my long-threatened work: The Constitution as a Failure.
The Constitution was, of course, a flop unless you are prepared-as
a number of historians have been-to write off the Civil War as a
sort of "boys will be boys" affair. A document whose ambiguities
led within seventy-five years to a hecatomb in which well over half a
million young Americans lost their lives (a higher percentage of our
population than the British, French or Germans lost in World War
I) hardly created a Novus Ordo Seclorum.
Be that as it may, I fully share the view of James Hutson that
the search for original intent is a snipe hunt. We can discover the
intent of delegate A on issue Y, of delegate B on issue Z, ad infinitum, but when you put the pieces together they do not add up to
probative evidence of collective intent. We know the framers
wanted to create a strong free republic (except for slaves) which
would be capable of surviving in the state of nature known as international relations. But when it comes to the question, "Does the
first sentence of article II vest the president with Locke's 'federative
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power,' i.e., prerogative jurisdiction in the conduct of foreign affairs?" we hardly have a clue.
In The Federalist No. 64 John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
under the Confederation, hinted that the president was not simply a
legislative tool, but Jay was not a delegate-and the perennial
shortage of money to pay interest on our debts was enough to make
him, and founding "uncles" Jefferson and Adams in Paris and
London, vigorous opponents of legislative supremacy. In short,
anyone who claims to know that the framers would have considered
the War Powers Resolution of 1973 constitutional, or unconstitutional, is an astrologer, not a scholar. I happen to think, based on
broad contextual evidence such as the general revulsion that Americans felt toward "monarchical usurpations," that the odds are they
would support it-just as I believe on the same basis that judicial
review of congressional acts was part of the background music-but
my hunches, however well-informed, would be thrown out by any
court in the country for lack of proof.
So where do we go from here? Now that the party is over, the
first thing to do is get the children off the streets. To put it another
way, we must reclaim the Constitution from the mystery-mongers
and restore it to its central position in American political culture. It
was first and foremost a political document-not a Decalogue, Nicene Creed, or Thirty Nine Articles. Its authors were a singularly
talented group of experienced politicians who had emerged from the
most participatory society in Western history, but they failed to
square the circle that led to disaster in 1861, namely, the relationship of states to nation (or "general government" as they would
have put it).
Instead of reading the mystery story backwards, we must continue-in Maitland's luminous phrase-"to think ourselves back
into a twilight," and eschew the temptations of retrospective symmetry. And above all, we should be grateful that nobody had a
telephone-such fascinating byplay as Jefferson's discussion with
Madison on the proposed scope of first amendment protection
would surely have been lost rather than in the archives.
THOMAS P. LEWIS4
For several reasons the subject of constitutional law tends to be
submerged in my mind by the subject of the Supreme Court as an
institution. For some time now I have felt uneasy about the direction many of our courts seem to be taking. My hunch is that the
4.
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